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Management Buy-out (MBO) plays a great role in clarifying the property of the 
enterprise, decreasing the cost of principle-agent, stimulating management. MBO 
develops very quickly in western countries with mature market economy. It has 
excellent operational processes and gets support from mainstream economics theory. 
With strategic adjusting of China state-owned economy, state-owned enterprises will 
withdraw from competitive industries. MBO is a way of state-owned property right 
withdrawing. Theoretical circles and the securities industry both concern it. 
Based on the property right theory, principle-agent theory, corporate governance 
theory and with the game theory as the main research tool, this paper make a study 
about the issue of selling、the purchasing price of state-owned enterprises and the 
issue of supervision during the process of  MBO of  state-owned enterprises. At last 
we give some advices. 
The main research contents and corresponding results are as follows:  
Firstly, we elaborate the concept of MBO and the related theory: the property 
right theory, principle-agent theory, corporate governance theory and the main 
research tool --the game theory; Secondly, we describe development processes and 
their differences of different countries all over the world; Thirdly, we use the game 
theory to establish a complete information static model and an incomplete information 
static model to judge the necessity of MBO of state-owned enterprises. The two 
models are the basis of the bargain model. We also establish a incomplete information 
dynamic model to analyze the issue of purchasing price. At last we use the game 
theory to discuss the supervision issue in MBO of state-owned enterprises, the model 
gives the theoretical support for the government to adopt monitoring strategies. 
Fourthly, combing the analysis of game model, we give some advices. 
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从 1999 年非上市公司四通集团改制打响中国 MBO 第一枪，1999 年粤美的

















































1.3.1 MBO 在国外的研究现状 












                                                        
1魏建.叶勤.MBO的新解释：企业家精神说[N].《证券市场导报》，2003（4）. 































从莱特 1980 年发现 MBO 起 20 多年以来，国外对于 MBO 的实证研究首先
是研究 MBO 所具备的特点，进而借用并购绩效研究方法和经理持股绩效研究方
法来研究 MBO 的效果。  
美国经济学家伯利（Berle）和米恩斯（Means）研究了经理层变革，并提出
了著名的伯利――米恩斯模型，他们采用实证分析方法对美国 大的 200 家非金
融公司持股控制状况进行了研究，结果发现公司的控制权从股东逐步转向职业经
理人6。   
德安杰罗等 早对美国MBO进行实证研究，发现MBO的目标企业一般多为
                                                        
2 Jensen,M.C. The agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers[J]. American Economics 
Review.1986,323-329.  
3 Weston J. Chung S., Siu Juan A. Takeover, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance[M]. Second Edition. US 
Prentice Hall. Inc. 1998. 
4 （美）J.弗雷德.威斯通，（韩）S.郑光，（美）苏珊.E.侯格.兼并、重组与公司控制（唐旭等译）[M]北京：
经济科学出版社，1998. 
5 Bruining,J. and Wright,M.. Entrepreneurial orientation management buy-outs and the contribution of venture 
capital[J].Venture Capital,20024(2):1-22. 
6 Nelson, R. and Winter, S. An evolutionary theory of economic change[M]. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.1982.115~159. 

























1.3.2 MBO 在国内的理论发展 
在中国，MBO 主要被用于国有企业产权改革，处于刚刚起步的阶段，且其












                                                        
7 DeAngelo,H.,L. DeAngelo,E.Rice.Going private:minority freezeouts and stockholder wealth[J].Journal of 
Economics,1984,27:357-386. 
8 Jensen,M..The eclipse of the public corporation[J].Harvard Business Review,1989(5):61-74. 
9 Wright,Mike,Nick Wilson and Ken Robbie.The longer Term Effects of Management Buy-outs[J].Journal of 
Entrepreneurial and Small Business Finance,1996,(5):213-214. 
10韦建华. 提升我国纺织工业国际竞争力 迎接WTO的挑战[J].上海企业,2001（12）. 
11康钰.谈企业内部控制[J].黑龙江对外经贸, 2004（6）. 







































































































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
